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LABOR LAW REFORM: THE REGULATION OF FREE
SPEECH AND EQUAL ACCESS IN NLRB
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Ninety-fifth Congress a number of bills were intro-
duced calling for reform of our nation's labor laws.1 Although
these proposals led to the passage of a final bill by the House of
Representatives, 2 a successful filibuster in the Senate forced the
legislation off the floor 3 and prevented the enactment of com-
prehensive labor law reform in 1978. Nevertheless, the issues left
unresolved by the Ninety-fifth Congress remain the focal point of
labor relations conflicts and are likely to reemerge for congressional
consideration in future legislative sessions.
One of the most important areas of labor policy addressed by
the reform legislation concerned the free speech and equal access
rights of employers, unions, and employees in representation elec-
tions 4 conducted by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"
1 See S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S874 (daily ed. Jan. 31,
1978) (introduced by Sens. Williams and Javits); S. 1883, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
123 CONG. EEC. S12,226 (daily ed. July 19, 1977) (introduced by Sens. Williams
and Javits); S. 1855, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,889 (daily ed.
July 14, 1977) (introduced by Sens. Hatch and Tower); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S8814-16 (daily ed. June 8, 1978) (amendment in the
nature of a substitute introduced by Sen. Byrd); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
123 CONG. EEc. H7397 (daily ed. July 19, 1977) (introduced by Rep. Thompson);
H.R. 8310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H7170 (daily ed. July 14, 1977)
(introduced by Rep. Erlenborn). The House and Senate also issued reports to
accompany these bills. H.R. RiE,. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (accom-
panying H.R. 8410 as introduced by Rep. Thompson); S. EP. No. 628, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978) (accompanying S. 2467).
2 123 CONG. REc. H10702 (daily ed. Oct 6, 1977).
3 124 CONG. REc. S9405 (daily ed. June 22, 1978).
4 A question of representation exists when the petitioner supplies evidence that
at least 30% of the eligible employees in the unit desire to be represented by the
petitioner. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1977). Once an election is scheduled, employees
vote by secret ballot whether or not to accept union representation. If a majority
of employees vote in favor of a particular union, it will become the exclusive repre-
sentative of the employees in that unit. On the other hand, if the employees reject
union representation, another election cannot be held in the same unit for at least
a year. National Labor Relations Act §§9(a) & 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§159(a) &
159(c)(3) (1976). For general discussion of representation elections, see J. GET-
MAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPBESENTATION E.ECrboNs: LAW AND
EAL= (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. GETnAN]; R. Gow-ANn, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIoNizATIoN AND CoLrEcTIV BARGAINING 148-68, 189-93 (1976);
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAIv. L. BEX. 38, 66-106 (1964); King, Pre-
Election Conduct---Expanding Employer Rights and Some New and Renewed
Perspectives, 2 INDus. REL. L.J. 185 (1977).
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or "Board") pursuant to sections 7 and 9 5 of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 6 Advocates of reform argue
that the present statutory scheme for the regulation of campaign
speech and conduct unduly hampers union organizing and under-
mines employees' rights to a free and fair decision on union repre-
sentation. In contrast, opponents maintain that current practices
regulating election speech and conduct are adequate.
This Comment will examine existing standards governing free
speech and equal access in NLRB representation elections in light
of these recent legislative developments. Section II presents an
historical review of statutory and judicial responses to conflicts
involving campaign speech and conduct since the passage of the
NLRA in 1935. This discussion will identify the major problems
and inconsistencies in present regulatory policies, suggesting that a
unified approach to this area of labor law is a prerequisite to mean-
ingful reform. Following this background, section III sets forth
and evaluates the major policy options available to Congress and
the NLRB in their consideration of free speech and equal access
issues. Section III will also present a model unified approach,
advocating the following changes in the current regulatory scheme:
(1) application of section 8(c) of the Act to representation elections;
(2) regulation of speeches made during the last twenty-four hours of
the campaign; (3) an opportunity for unions to respond to captive
audience speeches; (4) balanced enforcement of employer no-
solicitation or distribution rules; and (5) the prohibition of home
visits by unions. Finally, section IV will apply the model to the
major bills proposed during the Ninety-fifth Congress, analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of the free speech and equal access por-
tions of this attempted legislation.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREE SPEECH AND
EQUAL AccEss
A. Election Speech Policy
1. Strict Neutrality
Prior to 1935 there were no limitations upon what an employer
could lawfully say to his employees in a labor relations context.
7
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 159 (1976).
6 49 Stat 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151-168 (1976)).
7 See Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations
Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. BEv. 243, 255 (1963).
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But the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in that
year dramatically altered this situation.8 Section 7 of the Act
afforded employees the right to self-organization through labor
unions 9 and section 8 (a) (1) provided that any interference with
these rights would constitute an "unfair labor practice." "0
In applying the Act, the NLRB viewed the encouragement of
union organization as one of its principal functions.11 The Board
placed a high value on the full freedom of employees to form, join,
or assist labor unions, and was reluctant to permit any interference
with this right, even if an important competing freedom such as
the first amendment freedom of speech 12 was involved.' 3 Under-
lying this approach was the belief that an employer's superior
economic position carries with it an inherent suggestion of eco-
nomic reprisal that lends substantial weight to his expressions.' 4
Consequently, the Board's adjudicatory policy required employers
to maintain a position of strict non-interference or neutrality toward
union attempts to organize their employees.' 5 Any verbal inter-
ference with these activities was interpreted as an infringement of
employees' section 7 rights and as thus constituting an unfair labor
practice.' 6
8 Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version codified at 29 U.S.C.
§151-168 (1976))
9 Under the original Act, section 7 provided: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat.
452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
10Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-Cl) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
11 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). See
also Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Repre-
sentation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1245 & n.17 (1963).
12 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
13 See generally A. Cox, LAw AND TBE NATIONAL LABOR PoLicy 40, 42-44
(1960).
14 The Board expressed this view during its first year in operation in Wheeling
Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699 (1936), enforced per curiam, 94 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir.
1938), where it commented that "[t]he power of an employer over the economic
life of an employee is felt intensely and directly," and that "[t]he employee is
sensitive to each subtle expression of hostility upon the part of one whose good
will is so vital to him, whose power is so unlimited, whose action is so beyond
appeal." 1 N.L.R.B. at 709. See also Koretz, Employer Free Speech Under the
Taft-Hartley Act, 6 SYACUSE L. Buy. 82, 83 (1955); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 125
(1938).
15 See Note, Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA.
L. R v. 231, 231 (1962).
16 See NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
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To insulate its strict neutrality doctrine from possible first
amendment challenges, the Board asserted that every case finding
employer expression in violation of the Act "occurred against a
background of open manifestation of hostility to self-organiza-
tion." 17 In this manner the Board was never forced to find an
unfair labor practice on the basis of expression alone.' 8 Neverthe-
less, the actual effect of the entire scheme was that election cases
involving employer expression were routinely' 8 found violative of
the Act.
2. Reaction Against Strict Neutrality: Virginia Electric
and Section 8(c)
As experience with the Act grew, the cases arising under it
came to involve less egregious employer conduct, and an attack on
the Board's "strict neutrality" doctrine began.20 By 1941 there was
significant conflict among the various circuit courts as to the scope of
an employer's right of free speech under the NLRA.21 In response
17Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis. L.
REv. 211, 217 (quoting NLRB, Report of the National Labor Relations Board to the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor Upon S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550,
S. 1580 at 60 (1939)).
18 Note, Free Speech and Free Choice in Representation Elections: Effect of
Taft-Hartley Act Section 8(c), 58 YAIn L.J. 165, 165 n.2 (1948). "There appears
to be no case, however, wherein the finding of unfair labor practices was based on
mere expression apart from other coercive circumstances." Id. Board Chairman
J. Warren Madden stated, in 1939, during hearings conducted by the Senate Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, that: "We have not, as I recall, had a case in which
expressions of opinion were completely unaccompanied by other unfair labor prac-
tices." See National Labor Relations Act and Proposed Amendments: Hearings
Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 155 (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Senate Hearings].
Although the Board avoided finding unfair labor practices on the basis of
expression alone, the free speech element was still handled independently in its
opinions, and within these opinions employer anti-union speech was found to violate
section 7 independently. See, e.g., In re Mushkin Show Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 1, 7
(1938).
19 In some cases employer statements were found permissible under the Act.
Generally these cases involved an instance where a "background of hostility" was
clearly not present. As a result, although charges were made, a formal complaint
was usually not issued by the appropriate Regional Director. See 1939 Senate
Hearings, supra note 18, at 161-65.
20 See Killingsworth, supra note 17, at 211-13. The Board was seen as too
ready to construe employer speech as a violation of the Act. Id. 237.
In 1940, a congressional investigating committee unsuccessfully recommended
an amendment to the Act that would have specifically protected employer speech
unless accompanied by "acts of coercion, intimidation, discrimination, or threats
thereof." See H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 82-83, 90-91 (1940).
21 See Note, Limitations upon an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech,
38 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1039 (1952).
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to this conflict, the Supreme Court decided to review the issue in
the case of NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
22
The Supreme Court's decision in Virginia Electric announced
three essential principles.2 First, an employer was free to express
his views on general labor policies without violating the Act. This
development marked the end of the "strict neutrality" era. Second,
in determing whether there was a violation of the Act the Board was
required to look at the total conduct or activities of the employer.
Finally, employer speech could be scrutinized by the Board in its
attempts to establish whether an employer's overall conduct had had
a coercive impact on workers.
In practical terms Virginia Electric did not represent a major
shift in labor policy, because the Board had relied heavily upon the
existence of a "background of hostility" or other unfair labor prac-
tices when enforcing its "strict neutrality" principle.24 The Board's
test, however, had been informal; it did not require an evaluation
of all aspects of a case. For this reason, the Court in Virginia
Electric explicitly mandated that utterances were not to be separated
from their background, and that consideration of all of the surround-
ing circumstances was necessary to determine whether utterances
were coercive.
25
Following Virginia Electric, several appellate courts held that
the Board had exceeded its statutory mandate in finding employer
speech violative of the Act under the "totality of the conduct"
22314 U.S. 469 (1941). There was apparently some reluctance on the part
of the Court to hear the issue, as it had denied certiorari in four separate cases
raising the question before deciding to review the Virginia Electric case. See
42 COLUm. L. REv. 862, 864 n.9 (1942).
23 Id. 477.
24 See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
25 314 U.S. at 479. As part of its original decision in Virginia Electric, the
Board found that the company bad "interfered with, restrained, and coerced" its
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights through the use of a bulletin and
speeches. 20 N.L..B. 911, 919-24 (1940). The Fourth Circuit, on review, refused
to enforce any of the Board's cease and desist orders, noting that the effect of the
only supportable unfair labor practice had long since dissipated. 115 F.2d 414, 423
(4th Cir. 1940).
The Supreme Court held that the Board was required to examine the "total
activities" of the employer, not just the notice and speeches, to see whether the
conduct as a whole restrained or coerced employees in the exercise of their freedom
of choice under the Act. 314 U.S. at 477. On remand, the Board found that the
"total activities" involved evidenced an interference with the employees' free choice
of representatives. 44 N.L.R.B. 404, 429 (1942). This decision was affirmed by
both the Fourth Circuit, 132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942), and the Supreme Court,
319 U.S. 533 (1943). See generally Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and
the Wagner Act, 20 TUL. L. REv. 469, 493-94 (1946) (discussing the impact of
the decision on the Board); 7 NLRB ANr. REP. 70 (1942).
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test.26 By 1947, the influence of these appellate court holdings and
the appointment of several less labor-oriented members to the
Board 27 had altered Board policy in this area.28  Speech came to be
viewed as separable from other employer conduct in certain circum-
stances; and as such, it was not a factor in the finding of "totality of
conduct" violations of section 8 (a) (1).29
In one important area, however the Board was unwilling to
separate speech from the employer's surrounding conduct. It held
in Clark Bros. Co.30 that an employer violated the Act by compelling
his employees to listen to an anti-union speech during working
hours. Although the speech might have been constitutionally pro-
tected in itself, the conduct was held to be inherently coercive. The
Board compared this type of speech to the conduct of a person who
physically restrains his listeners while exercising his freedom of
speech.31
On review, the Second Circuit concluded that it was unwilling
to hold a captive audience speech to be an unfair labor practice
per se, but it enforced the Board's order after finding that the total
actions of the employer constituted coercive conduct.32 In reaching
its decision, the court stated a policy that became the foundation of
the equal opportunity doctrine for union access to the workplace:
"An employer has an interest in presenting his views on labor
relations to his employees. We should hesitate to hold that he may
not do this on company time and pay, provided a similar opportunity
to address them were accorded representatives of the union." 33
The pent-up frustrations of the war years contributed to the
election of a Republican Congress in 1946. Following crippling
nationwide strikes in the coal, steel, auto, and maritime industries,
this Congress enacted major amendments to the original labor act
26 E.g., Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922, 927-29 (3d Cir.
1944).
27 See Wollett & Rowen, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16 Omo ST.
L.J. 380, 383 (1955).
2
81d. 382-84. See also Reynard, Free Speech Problems in Organizational
Activities, 36 TEx. L. REv. 908, 922-23 (1958).
29 See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 132, 134 (1947); Fisher
Governor Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1294 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 913 (8th Cir.
1947).
3070 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). For a
contemporaneous review of the decision, see Note, 14 U. Cm. L. RBv. 104 (1946).
31 70 N.L.R.B. at 805.
32NLRB v. Clark Bros., 163 F.2d at 376.
33 163 F.2d at 376 (dictum) (emphasis added). See Koretz, Employer inter-
ference With Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 399, 402 (1960).
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in 1947.34 The primary provision of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 35
dealing with the area of free speech and equal access was section
8 (c). The section provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of any
unfair labor practice under any provision of this sub-
chapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.36
Despite some uncertainties 37 about the intended meaning of
section 8 (c), it is clear that the amendment was specifically designed
to have at least three effects. First, it was clearly intended to over-
rule the Board's decision in Clark Bros. Co. and to prevent the Board
from finding captive audience speeches to be unfair labor practices.
38
Second, the amendment was designed to alter alleged Board misuse
of the "totality of conduct" doctrine by preventing it from holding
otherwise privileged employer speech to be coercive because the
employer had committed some severable and unrelated unfair labor
practice.39 Finally, there was a great desire, particularly in the
House of Representatives, 40 to prevent the Board from using non-
coercive employer statements as evidence to establish unrelated
coercive conduct.
The passage of section 8 (c) marked a new phase in the develop-
ment of free speech and equal access policy. In its 1948 annual
report, the Board recognized that the overall effect of the 8(c)
statutory amendment was to afford employers greater protection in
this area.41 Nevertheless, it declined to give free rein to pre-election
34 See Pollitt, The National Labor Relations Board and Race Hate Propaganda
in Union Organization Drives, 17 ST,. L. REv. 373, 381 (1965). See also
J. Goui.nEN, MEANY 138-46, 155-56 (1972); STATUTORY HISTORY Or =m UNITED
STATES-LABOR ORGANmzAT ON 548-53 (R. Koretz ed. 1970).
3 5 Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (1947)
(current version codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)).
3629 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). For a discussion of the legislative history of
section 8(c) see NLB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1967);
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 t1Av. L. REV. 1,
18-20 (1947); Fuchs, Pre-Election Campaign Propaganda and Activities Before the
National Labor Relations Board, 4 BosT. C. INmus. & CoM. L. REv. 485, 493-94
(1963).
37 See Koretz, supra note 33, at 402-03.
38 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947). See also Note,
supra note 21, at 1048-50.
39 See S. BRE. No. 105, supra note 38, at 23; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 45 (1947).
40 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 33 (1945). See also 93
CONG. REc. 6859, A3043 (1947).
41 13 NLRB A-N. RE. 49-50 (1948).
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conduct, embarking on two new lines of regulation. One line of
regulation was the so-called General Shoe 42 doctrine. This doctrine
was designed to ensure that employees would be fully and fairly in-
formed during representation elections, and featured special controls
on employer conduct,48 including the regulation of speech. The
other approach concerned the captive audience speech situation.
The Board dealt with captive audience speech by imposing ad-
ditional duties on its exercise,44 rather than by directly limiting its
use.
3. The "Laboratory Conditions" Concept
In enacting section 8 (c), Congress provided that certain speech
could not constitute an unfair labor practice. Legislative attention
was not focused on the possibility that this protected speech might
interfere with the holding of a free election, apparently because it
was assumed that standards established for unfair labor practice
determination would govern the election area as well.45 The Board,
however, in the landmark case General Shoe Corp.,4 6 drew a sharp
distinction between the unfair labor practice and representation
election situations.
In General Shoe Corp., small groups of employees had been
brought into the employer's office on the day before the election to
hear an anti-union address, and had also been propagandized in
their homes. Although the employer's statements contained no
threats of reprisal or promises of benefit, and therefore were privi-
leged under section 8 (c), the Board set aside the election. It held
that while the employer's activities did not constitute unfair labor
practices, "certain of them created an atmosphere calculated to
prevent a free and untrammeled choice by the employees," and such
conduct warranted the invalidation of a representation election.
47
The Board further stated that "[i]n election proceedings, it is the
Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment
42 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
43 See Christensen, supra note 7, at 259.
44 See Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 611 (1951), -remanded on other
grounds, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
45 See Note, supra note 18, at 174. Before the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Board generally refused to set aside representation elections on the basis
of employer pre-election speech or conduct unless the conduct was found to be an
unfair labor practice. Thus, the standards used in determining whether an unfair
labor practice existed also governed the setting aside of elections. See Hercules
Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 650, 654 (1947); M.T. Stevens & Sons, 68 N.L.R.B.
229, 231 (1946).
46 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
47 Id. 126.
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may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." 48 When, as
in General Shoe, the "laboratory conditions" standard was not met,
the election would be set aside and "the experiment.., conducted
over again." 49
As a result of the General Shoe doctrine, there are two steps
involved in evaluating pre-labor representation election expression.
First, it must be determined whether the expression constitutes an
unfair labor practice under section 8 (c), that is, whether the ex-
pression contains any "threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." This determination is a subjective one because the Board
has declined to articulate definitive standards through its rule-mak-
ing or adjudicative powers.50 Although one general Board rule is
that "promises of benefit" by an employer will constitute an unfair
labor practice, while such promises by a union will not,51 this type
of general standard does not clarify the underlying uncertainty as
to which kinds of speech are unprotected. What, in fact, differenti-
ates a "threat" from a "prediction" or a "statement of legal posi-
tion"? Can an employer express his views on future negotiating
plans without making an illegal "promise of benefit"? Whatever
interpretation Board members give to section 8 (c), it is clear that
48 Id. 127.
49 Id. But cf. NLRB v. Aj. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (Court
upholds Board power to disregard laboratory conditions principle in the interest of
election finality).
50 Another important factor may be the context in which the given case arises.
Surely a hardened Pittsburgh steelworker may be less intimidated by employer ex-
pression than a rural southern textile worker to whom the expression may constitute
a real "threat." See A. Cox, supra note 13, at 42, 44. See also Tim SouTHwESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF ELEvENTH ANNUAL INSTrITTE ON LABOR
LAw, 244-45 (1964).
51 Compare Borden Mfg. Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1971) with Shirlington
Supermarket, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 666 (1953). See also Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 164 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1947). But see NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 270 (1973).
One possible rationale for this distinction might be the feeling that unions lack
the economic clout to fulfill their promises. If the union wins the election, the
employer is only obliged to bargain with it as the employees' exclusive representative,
but is not obligated to concede anything. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99
(1970); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). Thus, the employer in NLRB v. Exchange
Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), sent his employees a letter that spoke of the
"Empty Promises of the Union" and stated that "The Union can't put any of those
things in your envelope-only the Company can do that." Id. 407 (emphasis in
original). Given such a premise for distinguishing employer and union "promises
of benefit." the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision in Savair, 414 U.S.
270 (1973), that a union offer to waive initiation fees for employees signing
authorization cards was a "promise of benefit" becomes clear. A union does have
the power to fulfill a promise to waive initiation fees, even though it lacks the
power to make sure employees will receive a thirty cent-per-hour wage increase
once it is elected as their representative.
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the Board will issue a cease and desist order and take affirmative
action under section 10 (c) of the Act if the expression in question
is found to constitute an unfair labor practice.
52
Even if expression is found compatible with section 8(c), how-
ever, it still must be evaluated under the General Shoe "laboratory
conditions" standard. If the speech is found to have impaired such
conditions, the election will be set aside and a new election sched-
uled.53 Using this test, the Board has set aside elections involving
misrepresentations of fact,54 inflammatory racial appeals,55 and
captive audience speeches made during the twenty-four hours prior
to the election.,5
Although these two evaluative steps are analytically independ-
ent, they are closely interrelated in practice. When the Board has
been reluctant to find that expression constituted an unfair labor
practice, it has also been reluctant to find the expression violative of
the "laboratory conditions" standard. On the other hand, when
the Board has taken a more stringent interpretation of section 8 (c),
it has also been more likely to set aside elections on the basis of the
General Shoe test.
The political composition of the Board has had a strong im-
pact on the approach taken in its decisionsY7 The Eisenhower
Board, for example, took a narrow view of which speech, partic-
ularly employer speech, violated the Act, and essentially returned to
the pre-General Shoe notion that an election would not be set aside
5229 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
53 The effectiveness of this remedy is open to question. Unless the party's ex-
pression violates section 8(c), the Board can only set aside or postpone an election
until the proper "atmosphere" exists. It appears, therefore, that a party could
theoretically forestall a new election indefinitely as long as it did not commit an
unfair labor practice.
The General Shoe "laboratory conditions" doctrine has been unsuccessfully
challenged on first amendment grounds. See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451
F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971). The court differentiated labor representation elections
from public elections, stating that any chilling effect "must be weighed against the
interest of employees and the public at large in free, fair and informed repre-
sentation elections." Id. 879.
54 See, e.g., Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
The standards for setting aside a labor representation election on the basis of a
misrepresentation of fact differ considerably from those applied in a tort action for
such a misrepresentation. See generally F. H.arnP- & F. JAmms, THE LAw Or
ToRTs, 527-605 (1956).
55 See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962). However, where state-
ments about racial matters are temperate, truthful and germane, the election will be
upheld. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
56 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). But ef. Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (striking down a similar rule for political elections).
57See Hickey, Stare Decisis and the NLRB, 17 LAB. Lj. 451, 460-63 (1966).
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unless an unfair labor practice was found.," The Kennedy, or
"New Frontier" Board 09 on the other hand, overruled the more
permissive Eisenhower Board approach in the 1962 case Dal-Tex
Optical Co.,60 reaffirming the General Shoe "laboratory conditions"
doctrine and its tenet that expression can serve as the basis for set-
ting an election aside even if it does not constitute an unfair labor
practice.6 1
Following Dal-Tex, the Kennedy Board vigorously enforced
the "laboratory conditions" concept, particularly with respect to
campaign propaganda and misrepresentations of fact. In Hollywood
Ceramics Co.,62 the Board set forth the rule that an election will be
set aside where there has been a misrepresentation or other cam-
paign trickery which "involves a substantial departure from the
truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from mak-
ing an effective reply ... [and which] may reasonably be expected
to have a significant impact on the election." 63 In evaluating
whether the statement in question had a "significant impact" on
the election, the Board would examine a number of factors, in-
cluding whether the employees had independent knowledge with
which to judge the statement or should have known the statement
was false because of its extreme nature.64
Labor analysts have questioned whether the Board is capable
of determining what kind of statements actually have a "substantial
58 See, e.g., National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300, 1303 (1953).
For other cases implying that an election will not be set aside unless an unfair
labor practice is found, see L.C. Everist, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 810, 811-12 (1955);
American Laundry Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 511, 512 (1953); A.S. Abell Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 362, 363 (1953). See also Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations
Board; Herein of "Employer Persuasion," 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 594, 600-01 (1954).
59 For a sharp criticism of the Kennedy Board see K. McGunmss, ThE NEw
FI Oar NLRB (1963).
60137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
61 The Board, citing the Truman Board case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 935 (1950), held that the employer statement at issue was not protected
by section 8(c), and found it to be an unfair labor practice. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1786
& n.8. In addition, however, the Board specifically overruled the Eisenhower Board
case, National Furniture Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1953), and similar cases to
the extent they suggested that section 8(c) also applied to "laboratory condition"
objections made in representation cases. The Board stated that the "test of conduct
which may interfere with the 'laboratory conditions' for an election is considerably
more restrictive than the test of conduct which amounts to interference, restraint,
or coercion which violates section 8(a) (1)." 137 N.L.R.B. at 1787 & n.11.
62 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
63 Id. 224. The Eisenhower Board, in contrast, held that it would not "police
or censor propaganda used in the elections it conducts" but would instead leave
"to the good sense of the voters the appraisal of such matters, and to opposing
parties the task of correcting inaccurate and untruthful statements." Stewart-
Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1953).
64 Id.
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impact" on an election,65 and have criticized the subjectivity in-
volved in these determinations.6 Probably a more serious criticism
of the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, however, was the empirical
attack on its basic behavioral assumption that employee voters are
generally influenced by campaign misrepresentations and other
election propaganda. This attack was presented most forcefully in
a recent empirical study by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and
Herman (hereinafter "Getman") which purported to show that
employees are generally inattentive to information received during
representation election campaigns and uninfluenced by it in their
voting.6 7  Relying on this study and on a general perception of
increased employee sophistication, the Board overruled Hollywood
Ceramics in 1977 in Shopping Kart Food Market Inc.,68 and decided
to "no longer set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign
statements." 69
65 See J. GETWmN, supra note 4, at 148.
The Board counters these arguments by citing its special "expertise" in ad-
ministering the Act. See Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 531 (1973), enforced,
500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
66 See, e.g., R. WnuzAms, P. JAvus, & K. HurN, NLRB B1EuLATiox or
ELECTION CoNDUCT 57 (1974).
67 See J. GETamA, supra note 4, at 149.
68 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1977).
On December 6, 1978 however, the NLRB overruled Shopping Kart by a 3 to
2 vote in General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Dec. 6, 1978),
[1978-791 NLRB Dec. (CCH) VF 15,317, and returned to the standard of review for
alleged misrepresentations of fact set forth in its 1962 Hollywood Ceramics decision.
The Board ruled that a continuation of the Shopping Kart principle of not setting
elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements was inconsistent with
its "responsibility to insure fair elections," 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 slip op. at 4, and
clearly stated, in the context of questioning the conclusions reached by the Getman
study on which the Shopping Kart majority had heavily relied, that on the basis of
its 43 years of conducting labor elections it was convinced that employees "are in-
fluenced by certain union and employer campaign statements." Id. 10. Members
Penello and Murphy in their dissents expressed special concern about the vagueness
of the Hollywood Ceramics standards and the possibility that the making of objec-
tions under these standards provides a way for recalcitrant employers to delay for a
significant length of time their collective bargaining obligations. Id. 25, 31, 45.
From a policy point of view General Knit represents a reaffirmance of the
General Shoe notion that the Board has independent regulatory powers in labor
representation elections, and a step away from the application of § 8(c) in such
elections despite the fact that such an application may well have been the original
congressional intent. The decision thus makes clear that a permanent application of
this intent will come only from direct congressional action. Such action, if accom-
panied by provisions affording unions better access possibilities and allowing the
Board to broadly regulate speech during the election's final 24 hours, appears
called for.
69 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313. For an excellent overall study of the Shopping Kart
decision see Comment, Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach to the
Problems of Campaign Regulation, 56 N.C. L. REv. 389 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as North Carolina Comment].
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4. Summary
The foregoing historical survey raises several questions regard-
ing the existing regulation of free speech in labor representation
elections. First, why are employers allowed to state their opinions
as to unionization when this expression may frustrate employees'
section 7 rights to organize? Indeed, it can be argued that the con-
gressional policy of non-regulation embodied in section 8 (c) is
internally inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the Act set
forth in section 1.70 Conversely, why are labor representation elec-
tions treated differently than political elections if it is believed that
employees are sufficiently sophisticated and uninfluenced by election
propaganda to sort out misleading information by themselves?
Third, why do the courts permit the Board to set aside elections on
the ground that employer speech violated the "laboratory condi-
tions" necessary for a fair and free choice when section 8(c) protects
non-coercive employer speech from Board sanction?
B. Equal Access Policy
The subject of employer and union access to employees during a
representation election campaign has generated substantial con-
troversy.7' The liveliness of the debate springs from the general
perception that rules governing access have a profound influence on
the success or failure of union organizing drives.72
Generally, labor analysts presume that employers have an in-
herent advantage over unions in terms of access to employees because
employees must report to work each day. Consequently, the trend
of the law in this area has been toward the development of rules
that provide increased access to unions.73 These rules have taken
essentially two forms. First, there are those that from a historical
perspective can be seen as an outgrowth of the 1947 congressional
decision to permit employer captive audience speeches. Second,
there are those that regulate general union organizing at the work-
place.
1. Captive Audience Rules
As previously noted,74 the Board had ruled in Clark Bros.
Co. 75 that a captive audience speech by an employer con-
70.29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
71 See H.R. RE . No. 637, supra note 1, at 69.
72 See Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRAcusE L. REV.
93, 97 (1955).
73 See generally R. GomAN, supra note 4, at 179-94.
74 See notes 30-33 supra & accompanying text.
75 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
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stituted an unfair labor practice. The enactment of section 8 (c),76
however, forced it to reevaluate this doctrine. Consequently,
shortly after the Taft-Hartley Act took effect, the Board ruled that
a captive audience speech could no longer serve as the basis for the
finding of an unfair labor practice. 77 This holding was subsequently
extended by the Board to preclude the setting aside of an election
when an employer denies to the union an equal opportunity to
present its views before a captive audience. 78
The Board's policy toward captive audience speeches settled
into its present posture in Livingston Shirt Corp.79 There the Board
held that an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice if
he makes a pre-election captive audience speech and denies a union
request for an opportunity to reply, unless the employer maintains
privileged or unlawfully restrictive rules concerning union solicita-
tion at the workplace.80 In reaching its decision, the Board deter-
mined that unions do not need access to group meetings on employer
premises because they have adequate alternative means of reaching
the employee voters.8 ' This conclusion was directly contrary to
findings made by the Board two years earlier in Bonwit Teller,
Inc.,82 and the rule of that case was expressly disapproved.8 3
There are, however, two exceptions to the Livingston Shirt
doctrine. First, a retail establishment or other employer entitled to
implement more restrictive access rules because of the special nature
of its business, or an employer with an illegally broad rule, cannot
give a captive audience speech without affording the union a right of
reply.84 Second, under a rule announced in a companion case to
76 Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
77 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).
78S & S Corrugated Mach. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1364 (1950).
79 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). Prior to Livingston Shirt, the Board reverted
briefly to an approach similar to its discredited policy in Clark Bros. In Bonwit
Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), the Board held that employers were required
to provide unions with an equal opportunity to reply to captive audience speeches
on company property and time; a refusal to comply would co'nstitute an unfair
labor practice. Id. 612. See also Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1634
(1953).
80 107 N.L.R.B. at 409.
81 Id. 406.
82 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
83 107 N.L.R.B. at 407.
84 Id. 409. This was the situation in Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608
(1951). Bonwit Teller and other retail establishments bad been allowed to prohibit
union solicitation by employees during the employees' working and non-working time
on the ground that solicitation would interfere with customers and the course of
business. Because such retail employers are entitled to more restrictive access rules
than others, both Bonwit Teller and Livingston Shirt held that they were required to
afford the union a right to reply to any captive audience speech they might deliver.
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Livingston Shirt, Peerless Plywood Co.,85 an election may be set
aside if a captive audience speech is made within tventy-four hours
of an election. 86
Although Livingston Shirt's exception for privileged no-solicita-
tion rules has not fared well in the courts,T the Peerless Plywood
rule has remained good law. 88 In addition, the Board has main-
tained the right of unions to make home visits 89 while limiting em-
ployers' rights to do the same.90 The Board distinguished the two
policies on the ground that "unions often do not have the oppor-
tunity to address employees in assembled or informal groups." 91
Id. 611-12. Thus, while overturning the broader rule laid down in Bonwit Teller
that would have required a right of reply to all captive audience speeches, Livingston
Shirt effectively reaffirmed the narrower ground of that case.
85 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
86 Id. 429.
8 7 The Sixth Circuit has held that employers who have "privileged workplace
solicitation rules" need not afford unions a right of reply to their captive audience
speeches. May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
In at least one ease, the Board, while adhering to Livingston Shirt, has success-
fully avoided the conflict with the Sixth Circuit by finding a right of reply where a
privileged no-solicitation rule was so broad as to be unlawful. Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), modified, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965).
Whether it is meaningful to speak of a right of reply in this context may be
questioned. Maintenance of an unlawful no-solicitation rule constitutes an unfair
labor practice, even if the employer makes no captive audience speeches. Thus, the
union gains no advantage from the supposed "right of reply" that it did not already
have by virtue of the unlawful rule. See Note, The Right of Free Speech in
Representation Elections, 2 GA. L. RBxv. 433, 452 (1968).
88 The logic of the Peerless Plywood rule is open to question since justification
grounded in the union's need for time to reply to the employer's last-minute captive
audience speech seems inconsistent with the loss of the union's right of reply in the
companion case Livingston Shirt. Perhaps because of this, the 24-hour rule was
justified by the concern that 'last-minute" massed assembly speeches have an "un-
wholesome" and "unsettling" effect on labor representation elections, 107 N.L.R.B.
at 429-30, and cannot effectively be countered by allowable forms of campaigning
available to the union on the final day before the election. This conclusion, however,
based on the perception that last minute captive audience speeches are especially
influential and mandate extra safeguards, is difficult to reconcile with Livingston
Shirt's premise that employer captive audience speeches can be offset by unions
through ordinary electioneering methods.
89 Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957).
90 See Peoria Plastic Company, 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957). It is unclear, how-
ever, whether an election will be set aside where an employer visits less than a
majority of employees at their homes. Compare Excelsior Underwear Co., 156
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1246 n.27 (1966) (noting in dictum that the Board sets aside
representation elections "because an employer or his agents called on all or a
majority of employees in their homes in the period preceding the election") with
F.N. Calderwood, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1212 (1959) (setting aside an election
when an employer visited only seven or eight out of thirty-seven voter employees
and suggesting that the proper test is whether the votes of those visited could alter
the outcome of the election).
91119 N.L.R.B. at 133. The Board also noted that unions are never in the
position of "control over tenure of employment and working conditions which
imparts the coercive effect" to employer home visits. Id. 133-34.
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The effect of these home visit rules was to compensate unions, to
some extent, for the employer's right to make captive audience
speeches.
Nevertheless, the ability of unions to exercise their right to
make home visits, as well as their ability to reach employees in
other ways, whether by means of mailings, telephone calls, or other
communications, was hampered by the fact that they were unable to
obtain the names and addresses of large numbers of the voting em-
ployees.92 This situation led in 1966, to the Board's decision in
Excelsior Underwear, Inc.93 that within seven days of the ordering
of an election an employer must file with the Regional Director a list
containing the names and addresses of all eligible voters, for dis-
tribution to all unions involved. Failure to comply with the
Excelsior requirement was to be sufficient reason to set an election
aside.94
In deciding Excelsior, the Board passed up the opportunity
to reconsider its position on employer captive audience speeches.
The Board concluded in the case accompanying Excelsior, General
Electric Co.,95 that reconsideration of the captive audience reply
issue should be deferred "until after the effects of Excelsior become
known." 96 After a decade, however, the Board has yet to recon-
sider the issue.
97
The Board's positions on the captive audience component of
equal access policy lack any clear direction. The access rights
granted to unions have varied with the shifting political composi-
92 See Bok, supra note 4, at 99; McDonald, The Wyman-Gordon Case: A Second
Look at the NLRB's Excelsior Rule, 20 LAB. L.J. 599, 601 & n.18 (1969).
93 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
94 Id. 1239-40. The Board's Excelsior rule was upheld by the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). It should be noted that in
one case, where the employer complained that two-thirds of the eligible voters were
no longer employed by him, a federal district court, asked to enforce the Board's
subpoenae, limited the union's use of the Excelsior list, with respect to the former
employees, to mail contacts only. The district court reasoned that the rationale of
Excelsior did not fully apply where the employer no longer had easy access to the
voters at the jobsite, and that to allow the union to make home visits would give
the union not equal, but greater access to the ex-employees. The Fourth Circuit,
on appeal, held that the question was not ripe for judicial review until after the
Board took final action on the case's certification proceedings, thus effectively
avoiding a firm resolution of the unique problem presented. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the case. NLRB v. Daniel Constr. Co., 299 F. Supp. 423
(D.S.C. 1968), vacated, 418 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039
(1970).
95 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
96 Id. 1251.
97See Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation on Campaign Tactics:
The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 SmTN. L. Rv. 1465,
1481 n.98 (1975).
[Vol. 12.7:755
LABOR LAW REFORM
tion of the Board. Moreover, the Board has taken an ad hoc ap-
proach to the problem, tinkering with the right of reply, creating
exceptions to the captive audience doctrine, and prohibiting home
visits by employers. The result is a patchwork of rules that is
unrelated to the Board's general speech and solicitation policies and
that fails to meet the overall speech and access needs of unions and
employers in representation elections.
2. Organizing at the Workplace: Solicitation and
Distribution Rules
The second group of access rules consists of those that pertain
to union organization at the workplace. Underlying an analysis of
these rules is a basic conflict between two sets of rights: those
created by section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, which outlaws employer
"interference" with the employee activities protected by section
7,98 and those of employers as property owners and managers. For
example, when a union attempts to solicit members or distribute
literature on an employer's premises, section 8 (a) (1) would appear to
prohibit any employer interference with these activities. On the
other hand, an analysis of property rights would apparently justify an
employer's complete exclusion of such activities from his premises.
The Board and the courts have sought an equitable resolution of
this conflict by balancing the right to concerted activity against the
right to use and enjoy one's property freely.99 As a result, several
important distinctions have been drawn that mark out the legal
bounds of employer rules barring union solicitation and distribution
on the employer's property.
One of these distinctions is that between work and non-work
hours. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 100 the Supreme Court
held that employer rules prohibiting the solicitation or distribution
of literature by unions during working time are presumptively
valid, while such rules are presumptively unreasonable when applied
to non-working time. Presumptively valid rules will be found un-
lawful if enforced unfairly or if adopted for discriminatory pur-
poses.'01 On the other hand, presumptively invalid rules banning
9829 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 158(a)(1) (1976).
99 See Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the NLRB, 40
U. CQn. L. REv. 417, 418 (1971). See generally Fanning, Union Solicitation and
Distribution of Literature on the Job--Balancing the Rights of Employers and
Employees, 9 GA. L. BEv. 367 (1975).
100 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
101Id. 803 n.10. See generally Krupman, The Law and Strategy of Dealing
With Union Organizing Campaigns, in BAsic LABoR RELATiONS 17 (W. Krupman
ed. 1974).
1979]
772 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
solicitation or distribution during non-working time will be allowed
in retail stores 102 or where necessary for safety, efficiency, or disci-
pline.1
03
The Supreme Court has also differentiated between the rights of
non-employee union organizers and the rights of employees to
solicit or distribute literature on the employer's premises. In
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,104 the Court ruled that an em-
ployer may lawfully prohibit non-employee union organizers from
his property if "reasonable efforts by the union through other
available channels of communication will enable it to reach the em-
ployees with its message and if the employer's notice or order does
not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribu-
tion." 105 When it is clear that other "channels of communication"
are not open, however, the Board has allowed non-employee organ-
izers to distribute literature on company property.10 6 This situation
might occur, for example, in a mountain resort where employees
spend both their working and leisure time on employer premises.10 7
In addition to these rather complicated rules, however, the
Court and the Board have found it necessary to recognize further
exceptions. First, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. United
Steelworkers (NuTone) 108 that an employer may violate a valid no-
solicitation rule, even while he enforces it against unions, provided
that the employer's conduct does not create an overall imbalance
in the organizational opportunities available to both sides.10 9
Second, the Board has distinguished between rules governing oral
solicitation and those involving the distribution of materials, allow-
102 See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 (1944) (dictum),
enforced as modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725
(1946). See also Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 98 S. Ct. 2463, 2479 & n.2 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring).
'03E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973).
See R. GonmAN, supra note 4, at 181.
104351 U.S. 105 (1956).
105 Id. 112. The Supreme Court has justified this distinction between non-
employees and employees by pointing out that when organizational activity is carried
out by employees already rightfully on the employer's property, the employer's
management interest rather than his property interest is involved. See Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 n.10 (1976).
1o6 See, e.g., S & H Grossinger's Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965), modified, 372
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205-06 & n.41 (1978).
107 R. GonAN., supra note 4, at 185-86.
108 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
109 Id. 364.
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ing employers greater freedom to ban distribution in working areas
than is allowed for solicitation.110
The net result of the distinctions and exceptions in this area is a
body of complicated rules that appear to work particular hardship
on unions. Although the property interests of employers may
justify limitations on the access rights of non-employee union
organizers, the additional power of employers to violate their own
solicitation rules and effectively control the timing and form of
union organizing creates an imbalance in the election competition of
labor and management.
III. PRIMARY OPTIONS FOR REFORM
As the preceding review has shown, the existing rules govern-
ing election speech and access to employees during union organizing
campaigns are complex, riddled with elusive exceptions, and lacking
in unity or coherence. The balance that has been struck as a result
of these rules unnecessarily prejudices legitimate interests of both
employees and employers. Accordingly, this section will consider
various alternatives to the existing regulatory scheme and make a
number of proposals that would better effectuate the underlying
purposes of the Act.
A. Election Speech Policy
1. A Return to Strict Neutrality
One possible regulatory approach to election speech policy
would be for Congress to legislate a return to the employer strict
neutrality era, requiring employers to refrain from stating their
opinions on unionization during representation campaigns. Al-
though the adoption of this approach would facilitate the exercise
of employees' section 7 rights to organize, it can be criticized on
constitutional and other grounds.
The right of employers to express their opinions regarding
unionization has been afforded first amendment protection.". The
first amendment, however, does not afford an "unlimited license to
talk." 112 Although employer speech will usually fall within the
area protected by the amendment, it may be subject to reasonable
limitations when an important countervailing state interest is in-
10 See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). See also Erie
Maine, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 793, 802 (1971), enforced, 465 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1972).
III See notes 13-21 supra & accompanying text.
112 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961).
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volved." 3 The central question, therefore, is whether an important
state interest justifies the restraints advocated.
When the NLRA was passed in 1935, federal support for
unionization was clearly necessary to insure industrial peace." 4 It
may be that the strict neutrality doctrine limiting employer speech
was the least restrictive means available to achieve the important
governmental interest in establishing a viable balance of economic
forces." 5 In contrast to 1935, however, labor unions are today an
integral part of American life; they can no longer be regarded as
the clear underdogs." 6 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, for example,
recognized this greater parity by protecting employees' right not to
join unions." 7 Consequently, the governmental interest in sup-
pressing employer anti-union speech is not nearly so compelling as
it once was. Nor, as will be argued shortly, are such restrictions on
employer speech necessarily the least restrictive way to meet the
governmental interest in insuring non-coercive elections. A return
to the strict neutrality era, therefore, would not appear to be con-
sistent with the first amendment rights of employers.
The prohibition of employer speech is also questionable on
other grounds. Employers have strong economic reasons for re-
sisting unionization. Particularly in those industries lacking indus-
try-wide employer organizations, employers must deal with unions
individually and are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage if
they accept unionization and a competitor does not. This dis-
advantage results not only from the additional financial benefits
113 Reasonable limitations on employer speech have been upheld against first
amendment claims in the Second Circuit. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d
873 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the setting aside of an election for misrepresenta-
tion); NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (upholding strict
neutrality doctrine on theory that employer speech was coercive). But see NLRB
v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) (avoiding first amendment
challenge to strict neutrality doctrine by holding that the NLRA does not prevent
noncoercive employer speech). The applicable first amendment doctrine is spelled
out in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). But cf. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1975) (holding that expenditure limits in political elec-
tions do not meet O'Brien test for constitutional validity).
114 See National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
115 Even during this early period, however, doubt was cast upon the constitu-
tionality of the strict neutrality doctrine, in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,
314 U.S. 469 (1941). There, the Court avoided constitutional objections to the
doctrine by finding that the Act did not prohibit non-coercive employer anti-union
speech. See R. GoxmuAN, supra note 4, at 441.
116 See O'Connell, Collective Bargaining and the Rule of Law, in CoL.rcv
BARGA I nG: SuRvivA.L iN THE 70's, 77, 96-97 (R. Rowan ed. 1971).
117See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). But see 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976): "It is
declared to be the policy of the United States . . .[to encourage] the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining . . ." It is questionable whether collective
bargaining can be conducted without endorsing unionization.
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obtained by a union for its members, but also from the significant
loss of management flexibility normally engendered by the existence
of a union contract. 1" 8 In light of these considerations, congres-
sional endorsement of the strict neutrality doctrine would be an
inappropriate response to the current problems.
2. Complete Deregulation of Election Speech
Another reform alternative available to Congress is the deregula-
tion of all aspects of representation election speech. Although this
approach may initially appear to be as drastic and unrealistic an
alternative as a return to strict neutrality, it has been recommended
by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman on the basis of their
major empirical study of NLRB representation elections." 9 Their
evidence purported to show that employees' votes are not meaning-
fully affected by pre-election speech of the sort usually prohibited
by the Board, including threats, promises of benefit, misrepresenta-
tions, and interrogations. The authors would no longer allow these
forms of speech to be grounds for finding unfair labor practices or
for setting aside elections, and would likewise de-regulate restrictions
on employer solicitation, election-eve captive audience speeches, and
racially inflammatory invective.
20
The conclusions of this study certainly must contain an element
of truth. The sophisticated 121 and better-educated worker today
may be less intimidated by hostile election speech than his predeces-
sors, particularly in view of workers' growing familiarity with labor-
management relations. Indeed, the study found that thirty percent
of the employees sampled had voted in a previous Board election,
forty-three percent had previously been union members on another
118 See Wall St J., April 25, 1978, at 1, col. 5 ("It isn't wages that reduce
profitability at union firms"). One excellent example of this loss of flexibility is
that most union contracts specify that workers can be fired only for "just cause."
On the other hand, non-union workers who are without other formalized protection
can be freely fired at the employer's will. See Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 483-84 (1976).
1 9 See J. GCErM, supra note 4, at 159.
120 Id. 147-50.
121 Even this sophistication may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
it cuts against the need for employee protection. On the other hand it may call
for increased protection of the individual employee. A sophisticated employee,
knowledgeable of the labor-management scene, may more clearly understand the
parameters of his employer's or his union's full power, and in a labor representation
election, he might recognize implied threats more easily than others. See Phalen,
The Demise of Hollywood Ceramics: Fact and Fantasy, 46 U. QiN. L. REv. 450,
461 (1977).
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job, and seventy-five percent had a union member within their
immediate family.
122
Nevertheless, the study may also contain inherent limitations.
It was conducted entirely in the midwest 2 3 and it is possible that
such a narrow geographical area might yield atypical data because
of the kinds of industry concentrated there or its particular history
of labor relations. 2 4 The study has also been questioned because of
its conceptualization of the problems at hand, and because of its use
of statistical methods. 125 In particular, the data for the study were
collected under the "laboratory conditions" created by current Board
rules, and it is doubtful whether such data can warrant any conclu-
sion as to what the effects of "no holds barred" campaigning might
be.126 At the very least, it would seem unwise to rush headlong into
deregulation on the basis of one unconfirmed empirical study when
to do so would mean abandoning forty years of experience under the
Act.
Furthermore, even if the study's findings are accepted as true,
there may be other reasons for continuing to regulate speech. In
the first place, the study is mainly concerned with the effect of speech
on the outcome of an election. But it is not just the outcome of an
election that is important. The size of the win or loss is also im-
portant to both union and employer in defining the bargaining
power of each, and election speech may well influence this.127
Secondly, speech during representation campaigns may intimidate
employees in the exercise of section 7 rights other than voting. It
would be cumbersome and counterproductive to set up different
rules for the same speech, depending on whether election rights or
others are being protected. Finally, the authority of the Board and
of the national labor laws generally might well be weakened if
employers and unions were free to threaten employees with viola-
tions of those laws. The Getman study's radical distinction between
conduct and speech is one that is not usually made in non-labor
122 J. GETmAN, supra note 4, at 66-68.
123 Id. 35-36.
124 See King, supra note 4, at 210; Phalen, supra note 121, at 459.
125 Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a Trade-Unionists
Point of View, 28 STAN. L. BEv. 1181, 1182 (1976). See also King, supra note 4,
at 210-13. But see Kochan, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. Rtv. 1115, 1117-18 (1977).
126 See King, supra note 4, at 212.
2 7 In this connection, it is worth noting that Getman and his colleagues con-
cluded only that roughly 81% voted in accordance with pre-campaign attitudes and
87% in accordance with pre-campaign intent. J. GET AS A, supra note 4, at 62, 64.
This means that campaigns may well influence 13-19% of the vote. This is hardly
an insignificant percentage, especially in closely contested elections, both in terms
of the outcome and the size of the win or loss.
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contexts. Threats of illegality often suffice to warrant punishment
independently of any ensuing conduct. There is no reason to think
that allowing such threats in the labor context would be any less
destructive of respect for the law.
3. Applying Section 8(c) to Representation Cases and Codifying
Shopping Kart
There are a number of alternatives that lie between the ex-
tremes of prohibiting all employer speech during a labor repre-
sentation election campaign and allowing all speech by either party
during such a campaign. One alternative would be to maintain the
statutory status quo and allow the Board to use its administrative
discretion to change policies within this statutory framework. An-
other possibility would be to change the framework by applying
section 8 (c) to representation elections.
The arguments in favor of maintaining the current statutory
framework have considerable merit. The Supreme Court has clearly
held that the Board possesses "a wide degree of discretion in es-
tablishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair
and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees." 128
Furthermore, it is arguable that administrative agencies like the
NLRB should be responsive to changes in national political ad-
ministration.129 Such discretion might, of course, further politicize
the Board's policy-making. But even if concern about undue Board
politicization 130 is warranted, there are less drastic ways of ameliorat-
ing the situation than amending section 8 (c). 131
One problem with maintaining the status quo is that Congress
exercises preeminent jurisdiction in the field of labor relations and
may have intended that section 8 (c) should regulate all campaign
speech during a representation election. 32  It did not, however,
expressly state such an intent. Under these circumstances, a state-
128 NLRB v. A.I. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
129 See generally Hickey, supra note 57, at 460-61. Under this theory, if
Shopping Kart is to be the Nixon Board's "last hurrah," then so be it. The Carter
Board should be free to alter policy as it sees fit. (On December 6, 1978 the Carter
Board overruled Shopping Kart. See note 68 supra.)
130 See, e.g., Dunau, The Role of Criticism in the Work of the National Labor
Relations Board, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. oNr LAB. 205, 210-11 (1963).
131 One possible approach, adopted by some states with respect to their public
employment relations boards, is to designate statutorily that the Board comprise a
fixed number of representatives from certain interest groups. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13A-5.2 (West Supp. 1978).
132 See notes 33-41 supra & accompanying text. Dictum in Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n.11 (1962), stating that "Congress specifically
limited Section 8(c) to the adversary proceedings involved in unfair labor practice
cases and [that] it has no application to representation cases" seems wrong in light
of the historical background surrounding the passage of the section. Section 8(c)
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ment of Congress' present intent would be helpful. Such a state-
ment would not, of course, occur in a vacuum. Since 1948, the
Board has regulated election speech under the authority of the
General Shoe doctrine in a variety of ways, and the application of
8 (c) to representation elections would require it to overrule these
established precedents.
Despite its past practice, the Board did take a step towards just
such a reform recently in Shopping Kart Food Market Inc.,133
when it decided not to set aside elections because of misleading
campaign statements. In reaching its decision, the Board relied on
two premises. First, it assumed that employees are sufficiently
sophisticated to sort out misrepresentations of fact and other mis-
leading campaign statements. 34 Second, it assumed that employees
are generally not influenced by campaign speech.135 In making both
of these assumptions, the Board relied on data from the Getman
study. But the Board's reliance on this study was selective. It ex-
pressly refused to extend its holding beyond the area of misleading
campaign statements even though the study found that employees
are not meaningfully affected by any campaign statements. 13 6 More-
over, the Board overlooked the study's correlative conclusion that
all parties in an election should be accorded an opportunity to make
an effective reply to the statements of others. 37
As has been said above,' 38 however, the conclusion of the
Getman study that employees are not meaningfully affected by
campaign speech is questionable. For this reason, any extension
of Shopping Kart or application of section 8 (c) to all aspects of
representation elections would be inappropriate unless accompanied
by procedural safeguards. The effect of a misrepresentation or of
an inflammatory racial appeal, for example, may depend upon the
length of time remaining before the election and upon the existence
of an opportunity to reply. Such speech can be presumably be ex-
posed or offset by the opposing party if given the opportunity.
may have been applied specifically to unfair labor practice cases, but there is no
indication that it was meant to have "no application to representation cases." See
generally NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 658-59 & n.5 (4th
Cir.) (Soper, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
'33 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), overruled by General Knit of California, Inc.,
239 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978-79] NLBB Dec. (CCH) 7[15,317.
See note 68 supra.
134Id. 1313. Of course, some employees may be more capable than others
of making these distinctions. See Trustees of Boston University v. NLRB, 575 F.2d
301, 308-09 (1st Cir. 1978).
'35 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313.
136 See J. GEm.u, supra note 4, at 147-50.
137 Id. 157.
13 8 See notes 119-27 supra & accompanying text.
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Therefore, in order to counterbalance the effect of intemperate or
misleading statements made during the final hours of a campaign,
Congress should take two steps. First, it should authorize the Board
to prohibit the utterance of certain forms of speech within twenty-
four hours of an election 18 9 unless the opposing party is given a
reasonable opportunity to reply. Second, it should increase union
access to employees so that they can exercise their opportunity to
reply.
With proper procedural safeguards such as these, congressional
application of section 8 (c) to representation elections would be a
positive step. It would recognize the increased sophistication of
today's employees, and provide a practical test for the Getman thesis
that employees are generally inattentive to, and unaffected by,
representation election speech. Although the enactment of such a
provision would restrict the Board's discretion in this area, historical
examination shows that the Board's assumption of such discretion
may not have been warranted. Any such legislation, however, must
be carefully drafted. It should clearly indicate that misrepresenta-
tions of fact, and other campaign propaganda, are indeed "views,
argument, or opinion" of the kind protected by section 8(c) .140 On
the other hand, it should also be made clear that election threats or
promises of benefit will not be permitted.' 4 '
B. Election Access Policy
1. Captive Audience Speeches
Captive audience speech provides a bridge between the cate-
gories of free speech and equal access. The main concern with a
captive audience speech is that workers are forced on company time
and premises to listen to the speech. In the past, the Board has
experimented with three approaches to such speeches: forbidding
them, 42 permitting them with qualifications,' 43 and permitting
189 This suggestion resembles that developed by the Board in Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), except that the Board would also have the power to
regulate "last minute" speech outside the captive audience area.
140Section 8(c)'s language applies only to "[tihe expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
Thus, if misrepresentations of fact or other campaign statements now intended to
be regulated by the section were found not to be "views, argument, or opinion,"
the regulation would not be effective. For this reason, congressional intent must be
made very clear.
14 1 See generally note 37 and text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
142 See notes 30-31 supra & accompanying text.
14 3 See notes 79-87 supra & accompanying text.
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them without qualifications. 144 In recent years, the Board and the
courts have tended to permit captive audience speeches practically
without qualifications. 45 Consequently, in attempting to reform
this area of equal access, Congress could either prohibit captive
audience speeches altogether or force employers to provide unions
with a right of reply.
(a) Prohibition of Captive Audience Speeches
There are several arguments favoring the prohibition of captive
audience speeches. First, these speeches are widely recognized as
the most effective representation election campaign technique by
both management representatives and scholars ' 48 and are considered
a major impediment to union organizing.147 When an employer
gathers his employees for a group meeting on paid company time to
deliver an antiunion speech, he is implicitly telling them that he
cares more about their position on unionization than about their
work.
1 48
Second, the Getman study indicates that the Board's decision in
Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 49 has not created sufficient union access
opportunities to offset the impact of captive audience speeches. 50
This disadvantage is accented by the fact that an increasing number
of representation issues are resolved via the electoral process rather
than through the use of signed authorization cards that designate a
union as the exclusive representative of a particular unit.'5 '
144 See notes 77-78 supra & accompanying text.
145 See note 87 supra & accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., L. JACKSON & R. Lzws, Wh-qnsG NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGE-
iNm rr's STmTcY AN PREVENT=W PROGRAMS 119-20 (1972); Lewis, The Law and
Strategy of Dealing With Union Organizing Campaigns, 25 LAB. LJ. 42 46 (1974).
'47 See Call for Return to Equal-Time Election Rule, LAB. REL. REP. Y.B.
(BNA) 231-32 (1966) (report of address by J. Finley, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as
1966 BNA Y.B.]
148 Transcript of Television Program "The Advocates": Should Congress Provide
More Protection for Union Organizing? at 17 (April 27, 1978) (statement by Pro-
fessor Howard Lesnick).
149 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
150 The study found, for example, that while 83 percent of the sampled em-
ployees had attended meetings held by the company on company time and premises,
only 36 percent were successfully recruited by unions to attend after-hours union
meetings. The reasons most frequently given for not attending were the incon-
venience of the times and loctions (40%) and lack of interest (29%). J. GETmAN,
supra note 4, at 92.
151Under the doctrine of joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949),
enforced as modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914
(1951), which prevailed until 1966, an employer could refuse to recognize authori-
zation cards and could insist on an election only if he had a "good faith doubt" as to
the union's majority status. Now, however, unions have a more difficult time
gaining designation as the exclusive representative by this means. The employer's
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Despite this policy support for the prohibition of captive
audience speeches, however, overriding constitutional considerations
mandate the adoption of other reforms. If Congress prohibited all
captive audience speeches, employers could legitimately challenge
the limitation on first amendment grounds. Although Congress
could assert that the government has a substantial interest in con-
ducting fair labor elections, and legislatively determine that the
regulation of captive audience speeches is rationally related to that
objective, this approach is probably too broad to satisfy existing
constitutional standards. 152 The use of a flat prohibition is difficult
to justify when the same objective could be achieved by less re-
strictive means. One such alternative would be to grant unions the
right to reply to employer captive audience speeches. This method
would expand the "marketplace of ideas" available to employees
and encourage "free debate on issues dividing labor and manage-
ment." 153
(b) Reinstating the Union Right of Reply
Giving unions an opportunity to reply to captive audience
speeches on company time and premises, as the Board did in Bonwit
Teller, Inc.154 in 1951, would offset the perceived unfairness of
captive audience speeches and promote increased debate on election
issues. Nevertheless, the adoption of this reform would raise several
problems.
By affording unions an opportunity to reply to captive audience
speeches, Congress would be sanctioning a direct incursion on the
property rights of employers. Although Congress has been willing
to adjust the property rights of employers so as to accommodate the
section 7 organizational rights of employees, there are definite limits
to the appropriate scope of such incursions. Under the Act as
presently worded, for example, non-employee union organizers can
be barred from an employer's premises under the Supreme Court's
holding in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 55  Similarly, as the
intent is irrelevant; rather, a bargaining order is issued only in cases of serious unfair
labor practices by the employer. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594
(1969). See also Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301
(1974).
152 For a general discussion of first amendment rights in the labor law context
see notes 111-13 and 13-21 supra & accompanying text.
1 5 3 IAnn v. Plant Guard Workers, 323 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
154 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
155 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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Court ruled in NLRB v. United Steelworkers (NuTone),156 an em-
ployer can violate his own no-solicitation or distribution rule with-
out infringing the access rights of unions or employees. These
rules do not, of course, preclude Congress from changing the Act
and granting unions a right to reply. But they do suggest that care
should be exercised in balancing employee and employer rights.
Some guidance may be obtained from the limits on employers'
rights that the Court has recognized in the cases just mentioned.
Under Babcock & Wilcox, when "the inaccessibility of employees
makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to com-
municate with them through the usual channels," 157 an employer's
right to exclude non-employee organizers from his property must
yield "to the extent needed to permit communication of information
on the right to organize." 168 Similarly, an employer's violation of
his own no-solicitation or distribution rule can still constitute an
unfair labor practice under NuTone. In NuTone, the Court
merely held that an employer's rule would not be invalidated "[i]f,
by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and re-
sources available to the union, the opportunities for effectively
reaching the employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a no-
solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer's ability to
promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union
views." 159 Thus, under these cases a union can justify the provision
of a right to reply if it can demonstrate that captive audience
speeches create a substantial "imbalance in the opportunities for
organizational communication" 160 that cannot be redressed by any
other means. In keeping with these cases, then, Congress could
guarantee a right of reply to unions by making a legislative deter-
mination that captive audience speeches create a "glaring" organi-
zational imbalance in all situations.
Given congressional recognition of such a right to reply, how-
ever, there are three implementation problems that would need to
be resolved before the right could be effective. First, the cost of
replying to a captive audience speech must be allocated either to the
union or to the employer. On first impression, requiring the em-
156 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
157 351 U.S. at 112.
158 Id. Even if a union is able to demonstrate the requisite need for access to
an employer's property, that access is limited to union organizers, to prescribed non-
working areas, and to the duration of the organizational activity. Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1972).
159 357 U.S. at 364.
160 Id. 362.
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ployer to pay the cost and subsidize the union organizational efforts
appears unfair. It is notable, however, that a union's equal oppor-
tunity right is only triggered when an employer chooses to act.
Consequently, it can be argued that if the employer takes the
initiative and forces his employees to listen to his anti-union speech
on company-paid time, then he should also pay for the employees to
hear the other side. An alternative might be to require the com-
pany to pay the employees their regular salary, but to require the
union to pay for janitorial and other expenses directly incident to its
use of the employer's premises.
Second, it should be decided whether employers should be
afforded a right to reply to union hall speeches made by union
representatives.' 1 Although it could be argued that a balanced and
equitable approach requires a dual right of reply, union hall meet-
ings do not have the same element of compulsion as do captive
audience speeches, and thus do not constitute a clear advantage. As
a result, the rationale for giving a right of reply is not present.
Third, it should be decided at what point in the union's
organizing campaign the equal opportunities doctrine will be ap-
plied. A formal question of representation resulting in the schedul-
ing of a labor election exists only when the petitioning union sup-
plies evidence, usually in the form of signed authorization cards,
that thirty percent of the eligible employees in a unit want to be
represented by that union. 162 Consequently, this thirty percent
standard could easily be used to determine when the union's captive
audience right of reply will be triggered. The problem with this
standard, however, is that a union may never garner the initial
thirty percent needed to schedule an election if the employer
effectively uses his power to give captive audience speeches. A
thirty percent standard would thus undercut the rationale for
adopting the equal opportunity doctrine in the first place, because
it would fail to offset the marked advantage resulting from captive
audience speeches. The problem, then, is deciding what point
below thirty percent should trigger union reply rights.
This problem becomes more complex when the role of inter-
venor unions is considered. 163 Intervening unions that have not
161 See 123 CoNG. REC. H10,639-47 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977).
16229 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1977).
163 Once the petitioning union has made a 30 showing of interest and an
election is scheduled, other unions can win a place on the ballot more easily. The
Board does not generally require these intervening unions to present a certain
percentage of authorization cards; the extent of the showing of interest required is
an administration matter not litigable by the parties. Beneke Corp., 109 N.L.R.B.
1191, 1192 (1954) (citing Hughes Gun Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 913, 913 n.2 (1951)).
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demonstrated a ten percent showing of interest are already at a
significant disadvantage because they cannot block election schedul-
ing agreements between an employer and a petitioning union. 164
Handicapping them even further by denying them the right of
reply to employer captive audience speeches might be a fatal blow
to their chances for success. Moreover, such denial would be in-
consistent with the idea that because authorization cards are of
questionable reliability' 6 intervening unions should be able to
test their strength in a representation election regardless of the
number of cards that they have accumulated. On the other hand,
guaranteeing an equal time right of reply to any union that has
produced only a handful of authorization cards is unwarranted. 166
One possible solution might be to distinguish between the
period before and the period after an election has been scheduled,
using a time allocation system for the later period. Under this
approach, unions with at least a ten percent showing of interest
would receive equal opportunity rights before an election has been
scheduled. After an election has been scheduled, however, all
intervening unions would have captive audience reply rights. The
total reply time allocated for all unions would be equal to the
amount of time used by the employer in his captive audience speech.
This reply time would then be divided among the various unions
in proportion to their support. Intervening unions with only one
authorization card would get reply time, but considerably less time
than the petitioning union that is able to show interest of at least
thirty percent.
67
The Board in Beneke, however, leaves open the possibility that the standard 30%
showing of interest requirement may be applied to an intervenor who seeks a unit
much different from that sought by the original petitioning union. Id.
The unstated rationale for this more lenient treatment of intervening unions
may be the feeling that authorization cards are not always reliable indicia of
strength. See generally Ashbrook, Labor Law and the 95th Congress, 28 LAB. L.J.
387, 391 & n.11 (1977).
164 See NLRB, AN Outnmn OF LAw AND PocEDuRE IN REPRESENTATrON
CAsEs §11022.3(c)-(d) (1974).
165 See Ashbrook, supra note 163, at 391 & n.11.
166 Even one authorization card has been deemed sufficient to win an intervenor
a place on a ballot. Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65 (1972). But see Jewel
Tea Co., Eisner Food Stores Div., 124 N.L.R.B. 319 (1959). For the view that
the Board's custom is to find one authorization card sufficient showing of strength
for an intervenor, see id. 322 (Leedom, dissenting).
167Such a time allocation scheme, however, could afford the employer a
"divide and conquer" advantage over the petitioning union, since such a union
would have to share the reply time with intervenors and might therefore be unable
to respond effectively to the employer's captive audience speech. In order to
compensate for this advantage, Congress could consider allotting unions a greater
total reply time than the time of the employer's initial captive audience speech.
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As an optional alternative to the equal opportunity doctrine,
Congress could authorize the Board to sponsor a series of pre-
election debates between employers and unions. The give and
take of standardized debates might better serve to educate and inform
the electorate than the combination of an employer captive audience
speech and a union reply. If these debates were held on working
time and premises, they could be used as a substitute for the ex-
isting right of employers and unions to deliver captive audience
speeches and responses. In addition, Board debates could provide
an additional campaign option for the parties to utilize at their
discretion.
Although the adoption of this reform could further the first
amendment interests of unions and employers in a free and robust
exchange of ideas, Congress should weigh the benefits of this
alternative against potential costs before proceeding with legislation.
For example, the debates could generate numerous casual remarks
outside the protection of section 8 (c) and lead to protracted litiga-
tion of unfair labor practice cases. Similarly, the debates could
hamper meaningful discussion if the parties were to use them as
fora for ideological tirades or mud-slinging.
In conclusion, providing unions with a right of reply to em-
ployer captive audience speeches and authorizing Board-sponsored
election debates would give unions additional opportunities to
present their positions to employees, and would help remedy the
advantage presently enjoyed by employers during election cam-
paigns. If Congress chooses to enact either or both reforms, how-
ever, it should also require the Board to develop rules regulating
the implementation of these requirements under its section 6
powers.10 8
(c) Altering the Home Visit Doctrine
As previously noted,169 the Board's present home visit policy is
based on the premise that unions need additional access oppor-
168 See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976). The rulemaking process would include an
opportunity for input from all interested parties, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(e) (1976), and
also would provide the Board with the flexibility to consider alternatives more
varied than merely upholding or overruling a precedent. North Carolina Comment,
supra note 69, at 403-04. For a general discussion of the Board's historical un-
willingness to engage in rulemaking and the relative advantages of that approach
over the case-by-case approach of adjudication, see e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79
YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National
Labor Relations Board, 70 YAx- L.J. 729 (1961); North Carolina Comment, supra
note 69, at 403-04; notes 87-89.
169 See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
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tunities to compensate for their inability to address employees on
a group basis. It is questionable, however, whether it is necessary
to compromise the privacy of employee homes to accomplish this
objective. If Congress alters the existing balance between labor
and management by providing unions with other access oppor-
tunities, the rationale behind the present doctrine may no longer
apply.
One of the justifications for the current home visit doctrine
is that employees are intimidated when their employer visits their
homes. 70 Although the Board has never advanced any evidence
in support of this proposition, 17' it is at least clear that the employee
risks reprisal if he actually turns his employer's representatives away
from his residence. Although an employee is protected against
reprisals taken by an employer,172 these legal protections are trig-
gered only when the employee brings a charge before the NLRB.'7-
Moreover, the unpredictability of this administrative remedy under-
mines the ability of employees to exercise their rights. First, it
may take years for the Board to reinstate an employee and compen-
sate him for his losses.'7 4 Second, it is impractical for an employee
to risk antagonizing his employer when he knows that he will have
to deal with the employer on a daily basis whether the union wins
or loses. Third, it is difficult to demonstrate that an employer's
actions constitute a reprisal effort. Thus, an employee is not truly
free to enjoy the privacy of his home and is subject to coercive
pressure on a one-to-one basis.
Furthermore, in the absence of some persuasive justification
for allowing union home visits, the present doctrine is similarly
indefensible. There is no evidence indicating that union visits are
any less coercive to employees than employer visits. If the union
wins, the employee will have to live with it on a daily basis. Al-
though he is legally protected from union discrimination by the
union's duty of fair representation 175 and from union violence by
section 8 (b)(1),176 it is often difficult to have these rights enforced.
170 Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34 (1947).
171 See Bok, supra note 4, at 105.
172 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
173 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
'74 See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 303 &
n.4 (1974).
175 See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Col-
lective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251
(1977).
17629 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1976).
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Thus, it is to the employee's advantage to permit home visits and
avoid antagonizing the union. Even if it loses the present campaign,
the union might win in the future and create problems for the
employee. In light of these circumstances, the exception for union
home visits is unwarranted' 17 and should be repealed by Congress.
A realistic appraisal of the political climate surrounding labor
law reform indicates, however, that it will be difficult to convince
unions to forego their home visit advantage. When the House
Committee on Education and Labor considered the reform bill in
1977, the majority explicitly rejected an amendment that would
have prohibited all home visits, but would have afforded unions
additional access opportunities 78 In light of the desire of pro-labor
forces to retain this right, it will be necessary for advocates of a
unified approach to convince unions that a comprehensive reform
package will create a more favorable balance than the existing ad
hoc system. One would hope that an opportunity for increased
access and meaningful election discussion will mean more to labor
supporters than the symbolic importance of a home visit advantage.
2. Solicitation Rules
Under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in
NuTone, employers are free to campaign throughout the workplace
at all times as long as an employer's activities do not create an im-
balance in the organizational opportunities of labor and manage-
ment.179  Consequently, although the organizational activity of
unions is circumscribed by employer no-solicitation or distribution
rules, employers can often deliver captive audience speeches and
violate their own solicitation rules without penalty. These access
advantages are further enhanced by the Supreme Court's refusal to
permit non-employee organizers to organize or campaign on com-
pany premises180
Even if Congress were to change the existing balance between
unions and employers in representation elections in the manner
advocated in this Comment by liberalizing the restraints on em-
ployer speech, prohibiting union home visits, and providing unions
with a right of reply to captive audience speeches, there would re-
main a compelling need to reform the principles currently governing
177 But of. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34 (1947)
(unions lack the control over tenure and working conditions "which imparts the
coercive effect to systematic individual interviews by employers").
178 H.R. RPn. No. 637, supra note 1, at 71.
179 357 U.S. 357, 362 (1958).
180 See notes 104-07 supra.
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union solicitation and distribution. Changes in this area of access
policy are necessary to give unions a reasonable opportunity to
organize an election and to present their campaign positions. Three
possible options for reform can be postulated: (1) permitting non-
employee organizers to solicit on company premises; (2) providing
unions with a right of reply whenever an employer violates its own
solicitation and distribution rules; and (3) providing for the strict
enforcement of these rules as to all parties with an unfair labor
practice sanction for discriminatory enforcement.
(a) Permitting Non-Employee Organizing
Overruling Babcock & Wilcox 181 and thereby affording non-
employee union organizers a right of access to employer premises is
unwarranted. Given the problems that would be caused by com-
peting unions, any proposal of this type would be difficult to im-
plement. It would be necessary to require a union to meet a
minimum authorization card standard before providing it with
access to the workplace. If this prerequisite were adopted, it is
questionable whether a union would actually need to utilize non-
employee organizers on company premises. Any union capable of
producing a sufficient showing of interest would already have an
inside cadre of supporters to campaign for it, obviating the need
for additional access.
Even if this additional access opportunity proved necessary to
equalize pre-election efforts, the benefits of the proposed change
would be too small to justify the costs. Congress should not sanction
a major direct incursion on employer property rights unless the
policy would clearly enhance a substantial labor policy objective.
(b) Providing a Right of Reply
Providing unions with an equal opportunity right of reply
would also be an inappropriate legislative response to the problem
of unequal access. Although both the coercive power of captive
audience speeches and the questionable constitutionality of a total
ban on this campaign technique merit the adoption of a reply right
for union representatives in that context, 8 2 the same considerations
do not apply to employer campaigning violative of established no-
solicitation or distribution rules. An employer's general solicitation
and distribution activities are not as potentially coercive as captive
audience speeches and do not significantly impair free debate.
181 351 U.S. 105 (1956). See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
182 See text accompanying notes 154-68 supra.
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Whatever the substantive merits of a right of reply, the desira-
bility of this reform is also undermined by administrative problems.
The use of a reply doctrine would necessitate the use of elaborate
regulations, setting out standards for the application of the right.
There are three reasons for this. First, it would be difficult to
define and identify an employer violation. How would a union
discover that an employer distributed an anti-union pamphlet to
one employee during working time? Second, even if the union
were aware of the incident, the proper dimensions of the right to
reply that would be triggered are unclear. Would an inside em-
ployee union supporter exhaust the union's reply right by giving
an anti-employer pamphlet to one employee, or would one incident
trigger a broader union right to distribute literature generally dur-
ing working hours? Third, the point in time when representatives
of a union should be afforded reply rights is similarly unclear. Un-
less solutions to these problems can be produced, the adoption of
an equal opportunity right of reply alternative would be a mistake.
(c) Providing Strict Enforcement
The final alternative-overruling the NuTone decision and
providing for strict enforcement of employer no-distribution or
solicitation rules-is the soundest proposal for reform. Employers
would be authorized to promulgate prohibitive rules or to delineate
the permissible limits of campaign activity at the workplace. If,
however, an employer were to decide to place restrictions on
solicitation and distribution, he would be required to abide by
them or to face Board sanction under section 8(a) (1).-1 Unions
would then have access to employees at the workplace insofar as
they had inside supporters.
One exception to the strict enforcement rule would be neces-
sary. In captive audience speech situations, it is preferable to allow
employers to violate their own rules as long as they afford unions
an equal opportunity to reply.284 In this way, open debate is
fostered and at the same time the coercive effects of such speeches
are minimized.
The main drawback of the strict enforcement alternative is
that it would leave the initiative with the employer. Potentially,
an employer could prevent a union from gaining the requisite num-
ber of authorization cards for an election by strictly adhering to its
own no-solicitation or distribution rules. The standards presently
183 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
18 4 See text accompanying notes 154 & 167-68 supra.
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governing such rules should, however, enable unions to offset this
possibility. As previously noted, an employer cannot enact an
overbroad rule that unduly restricts union access during non-
working times, limits the free dialogue of employees, or effectively
forecloses all channels of communication without committing an
unfair labor practice.J8
Another problem with the proposed reform pertains to the
traditional special status of retail stores. In the past these have
been allowed to bar solicitation and distribution in working areas
at all times.186 The rationale for this distinction is that solicitation
and distribution disturb business in retail sales areas of such stores
even if carried on by employees during non-working time. Despite
this reasoning, the inability of employers actually to monitor illegal
solicitation or distribution by employees or union organizers on the
floor of a busy retail store has caused many retail employers to
respond by violating their own rules. 187 Consequently, it is unfair
to require employers to abide strictly by their rules under the new
standard while union violations continue unchecked. Under these
circumstances, two alternatives are possible. Congress could either
exempt retail stores from the strict enforcement rules or it could
require unions to sign a pledge to refrain from unlawful solicitation
or distribution, adding a moral obligation to the union's legal
obligation to abide by these rules.
Requiring employers strictly to enforce no-solicitation or dis-
tribution rules would maximize the access opportunities of unions
without unduly infringing the business interests and property rights
of employers. Indeed, reform of the rules governing solicitation
and distribution is necessary to create a balance in representation
election campaigns.
C. Summary: A Unified Approach
The preceding sections have discussed various options for
reform in the area of free speech and equal access. It is crucial,
however, for Congress and the Board to address reform in a com-
prehensive manner, integrating the individual positions into a
unified approach. To further this goal, this Comment has made the
following suggestions:
185 See text accompanying notes 100-03 supra.
18 6 See notes 84 & 102 supra.
187 See generally Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1883 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2055 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of the Associa-
tion of General Merchandise Chains).
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(1) Section 8 (c) should be amended to apply to representation
elections, with the proviso that the Board should continue to regu-
late speech that is not a "threat" or a "promise for benefit" during
the final twenty-four hours of a campaign. Given the better and
more equal opportunities for union access to employees recom-
mended below, the application of section 8 (c) to the election
process would make particular sense. As long as each party has a
fair and equal chance to reply to the other's speech, the precise
content of that speech merits less concern. In addition, this change
would recognize the increased sophistication of today's employee,
and would implement a policy that arguably coincides with Con-
gress' original intent when section 8(c) was passed in 1947.
(2) Employers should be allowed to promulgate no solicitation or
distribution rules at the workplace and enforce them against unions
and other groups as long as they do not set overbroad restrictions
or violate the rules themselves. This provision would create a
better balance between union and employer access opportunities.
In the interest of free debate on election issues, however, employers
should be allowed to violate these rules in order to give a captive
audience speech or to participate in a Board-sponsored debate.
(8) If an employer chooses to give a captive audience speech, unions
should be given an opportunity to respond on company time and
premises. This access opportunity is necessary to offset the coercive
advantage that captive audience speeches provide to the employer.
In implementing this reform, however, Congress should direct the
Board to develop guidelines for captive audience speeches under
its section 6 rule-making powers, and to consider alternatives to
these techniques such as Board-sponsored campaign or organization
debates.
(4) Unions should be prohibited from making campaign visits to
employees' homes in order to protect the privacy rights of individual
employees and to place unions and employers on an equal footing
in this respect. If the preceding reforms were enacted, unions
would no longer have a clear need for access to employees' homes,
since they would have a chance to reply to employer captive audience
speeches or to participate in company-time Board-sponsored debates,
and would no longer be disadvantaged by no-solicitation or dis-
tribution rules.
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IV. FREE SPEECH AND EQUAL AccEss IN THE
NINETY-FiFTH CONGRESS
Labor law reform legislation introduced in the Ninety-fifth
Congress addressed the problem of election free speech and equal
access in a variety of ways. These proposals will be reviewed and
analyzed in light of the unified approach previously suggested in this
Comment.
A. Action in the House of Representatives
The labor law reform bills originally proposed in the Ninety-
fifth Congress, and the sections of these bills amending free speech
and equal access policy, reflected the ideological interests of their
sponsors and supporters. The Employers Bill of Rights Act of 1977
(Tower Bill) was introduced in the House as H.R. 8310 188 on July
14, 1977 by Congressmen Erlenborn and Ashbrook, and in the
Senate as S. 1855 1s9 by Senators Hatch and Tower. The Tower
Bill, which received considerable support from management
groups, 190 generally favored reduced government interference in,
and regulation of, the labor-management relations field. With re-
spect to free speech and equal access, for example, the bill called for
the application of section 8 (c) to representation elections. This
reform would effectively deregulate election speech and severely
curtail the Board's role in monitoring this speech.191
,88 H.RL 8310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. H7170 (daily ed. July 14,
1977).
189 S. 1855, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,889 (daily ed. July 14,
1977); text reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 187, at 17-25.
190 See generally- United States Chamber of Commerce, 21 CoNmssioNAL
ACnON No. 32 (Aug. 19, 1977). See also Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on
H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 747-48 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (letter from Robert Timmerman, president of
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, stating view that Tower Bill provides a
"balanced approach" to problems of labor-management relations).
'91 The tenor of this section of the bill is aptly indicated by its title, "Protection
of Free Speech":
Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act is amended to read as
follows:
"(c) The expressing of any views, argument, opinion, or the making
of any statement (including expressions intended to influence the outcome
of an organizing campaign, a bargaining controversy, a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute), or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic, visual or auditory form, shall not (i) constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this Act, or
(ii) constitute grounds for, or evidence justifying, setting aside the results
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In contrast to the Tower Bill was the Labor Reform Act of
1977 (Administration Bill) introduced in the House as H.R.
8410 192 on July 19, 1977 by Representative Thompson, and in the
Senate as S. 1888 193 by Senators Williams and Javits. This bill
represented the approach of organized labor and the Carter Ad-
ministration 94 to labor law reform and called for increased regu-
latory control. The primary change proposed by the Administration
Bill in the free speech and equal access area would have required
the Board to promulgate rules guaranteeing employees an equal
opportunity to obtain information from labor organizations when
an employer makes an election speech on company time and
premises.195 Although the precise parameters of this amendment
were unclear, it was apparently intended to grant unions an equal
opportunity right of reply to employer captive audience speeches. 198
After holding hearings on labor law reform from July to
September of 1977,197 the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
of any election conducted under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
S. 1885, supra note 189, at § 6, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 187, at
22-23.
The extent to which this provision would actually benefit employers vis-a-vis
unions is not entirely clear, however. Because the Board would be intervening in
only a very few clear cases, employers might have less incentive to advance trivial
objections to the union's election speech for purposes of delay. See generally
[1978 Labor Rel. Binder] 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) f 9146 (speech by NLBB Member
Penello).
192 H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H7397 (daily ed. July 19,
1977); text reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 190, at 3-16.
193 S. 1883, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REe. S12,226 (daily ed. July 19,
1977).
194 Labor Law Reform: Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legis-
lation, 13 WEEEY Comp. or Pums. Doc. 1031 (July 18, 1977).
195 The text of the equal access amendment to § 6 of the NLRA read as follows:
b)(1) The Board shall within tvelve months after the date of enact-
ment of the Labor Reform Act of 1977 issue regulations to implement the
provisions of section 9(c)(6) including rules-(A) which shall, subject to
reasonable conditions including due regard for the needs of the employer
to maintain continuity of production, assure that if an employer or employer
representatives addresses the employees on its premises or during working
time on issues relating to representation by a labor organization during a
period of time that employees are seeking representation by a labor organi-
zation the employees shall be assured an equal opportunity to obtain in an
equivalent manner information concerning such issues from such labor
organization ...
H.R. 8410, supra note 197, at § 6(b) (1), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note
190, at 5-6.
196 See Special Report of the AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law Reform:
Labor Law Reform, at I(c)(2) (1977).
197 House Hearings, supra note 190.
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passed the Administration Bill. 98 Prior to final action, however,
the House made three important adjustments to the legislation.
First, the equal access provision was clarified to apply only in captive
audience situations. 9 9 Second, a right of reply was granted to
employers, allowing them to respond to union speeches given at
union halls.200 Third, the equal access provision was amended to
apply to decertification and de-authorization elections, in addition
to representation elections.201 The two last minute amendments
are particularly troubling; while adhering to the principle of equal
access, the House failed to consider the possible consequences of
these changes.
20 2
The primary weakness with the action taken by the House
was its failure to take a more comprehensive approach. Although
the bill did correct the campaign imbalance caused by captive
audience speeches, it failed to address the existing management ad-
vantage with respect to other forms of in-plant campaigning left
unchanged by the NuTone 20 3 decision. Furthermore, the Ad-
ministration Bill passed by the House incorrectly viewed its reform
of the captive audience speech area as an isolated adjustment of
free speech and equal access policy. It failed to recognize that, if
unions are granted an additional access opportunity in the form of
a right of reply, the need to make campaign visits to employees'
198 The bill was approved by a 257-163 vote. 123 CONG. REc. H10,713-14
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
199 See 123 CONG. REc. H10,633 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Thompson).
200 This modification does not appear to be justifiable. Unions need the right
to reply to employer captive audience speeches because they lack any comparably
effective way of reaching employees. In contrast, union hall meetings afford unions
no particular advantage since employers are always free to hold similar meetings off
of company premises during non-company time. Consequently, legislation giving
employers access to union halls is not necessary.
201 Application of the equal access provision to de-authorization and decer-
tification elections is potentially confusing. These elections usually involve attempts
by insurgent employees to remove the union's certification or its union security
agreement. For a general discussion of these elections see R. GonMAx, supra note
4, at 49-50. It is not clear how equal access rules would apply in such elections.
On the one hand, the application of such rights might have been intended to provide
insurgent employees with a right to reply to union speeches in the union hall. On
the other hand, the House may have intended to grant a right of reply only to
speeches by an employer who, although generally barred from instigating decer-
tification or de-authorization petitions, is free to speak out during the election.
202 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. H10,639, H10,643 (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook);
H10,642 (remarks of Rep. Ford of Michigan); H10,643 (remarks of Rep. Fenwick)
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977).
203 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
[Vol. 127:755
LABOR LAW REFORM
homes is diminished,214 and that the increased opportunities for
debate resulting from this increased access might merit a corres-
ponding deregulation of the content of labor election speech.2°5
B. Action in the Senate
The Senate Committee on Human Resources, after holding
hearings on the Administration Bill and the Tower Bill during
September, October and November of 1977,200 decided to report an
original bill, S. 2467 207 (Senate Bill), for Senate consideration on
January 31, 1978. Despite the Committee's recommendation, how-
ever, heavy opposition forced the Senate leadership to submit a
substitute bill, H.R. 8410 208 (Byrd substitute), for Senate considera-
tion on June 8, 1978. After rejecting six cloture motions to end
debate on the Byrd substitute, the Senate moved by unanimous con-
sent to recommit the bill to the Committee on Human Resources209
on June 22, 1978. As a result, labor law reform legislation quietly
died when the Ninety-fifth Congress adjourned on October 15,
1978.210
Both the Senate Bill and the Byrd substitute represented a
more comprehensive approach to free speech and equal access than
the Administration Bill passed by the House. The primary change
proposed by both Senate bills was the application, with some limita-
tions, 211 of section 8 (c) to representation elections. If this provision
had been accompanied by the equal access provision found in the
original Administration Bill,2 12 it would have represented a sig-
nificant advance in the search for an equitable and unified approach
to free speech and equal access. Instead, these bills adopted new and
ill-conceived union access interpretations and provisions.
2 0 4 See text accompanying notes 169-78 supra. House members did seem con-
cerned with protecting employees' privacy, and rejected an amendment that would
have guaranteed equal access to the homes of both employers and union members.
123 CoNG. REc. H10,639-44, 10,647-48 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977).
205 See text accompanying notes 152-68 supra.
206 Senate Hearings, supra note 187.
207 S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REc. S874 (daily ed. Jan. 31,
1978), reprinted in id. S7525-28 (daily ed. May 16, 1978). See also S. REP. No.
628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPoRT].
208 HLR 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. Ec. S8814-16 (daily ed. June
8, 1978), text reprinted in id. S8816-18 [hereinafter the Byrd substitute].
209 124 CONG. REc. S9410-12 (daily ed. June 22, 1978).
210 Id. D1569, D1576 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
211 The key limitation was that the Board would have retained its present power
to regulate speech during the 48 hours prior to a representation election. S. 2467,
supra note 207, at § 6; Byrd substitute, supra note 208, at § 6.
212 See note 195 supra.
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Although the House had clearly limited the equal access pro-
visions of the reform bill to captive audience speeches, 213 the Senate
Bill interpreted these provisions in a far more encompassing way.
According to the Senate Committee, the language was intended to
provide unions with access to the employer's premises whenever an
employer used its premises for campaign purposes.214 Despite the
Committee's admirable intention to equalize opportunities for in-
plant campaigning and to better inform employees,2 5 its approach
was overbroad since admitting non-employee union organizers to
company property is not necessary to achieve those purposes. The
benefits that a union derives from using non-employee organizers are
minimal in comparison to the loss of property rights suffered by the
employer.216 Furthermore, since the Senate Bill would have re-
stricted non-employee organizers to campaigning during non-work-
ing time in non-working areas,21 7 except in the case of an employer
captive audience speech, the Committee's interpretation would not
have provided true access equality. True access equality exists only
when either (1) union representatives (employee or non-employee)
are accorded an exactly equal chance to reply whenever an employer
breaches his own no-solicitation or distribution rules; or (2) em-
ployers are required to follow their own rules exactly as they enforce
them against other parties.218  If the Senate had adopted the latter
approach, its reforms would have been significant.
The union access provisions of the Byrd substitute also failed
to guarantee access equality. In fact, the Byrd substitute effectively
gutted the historical components of an equal access right of reply
to employer captive audience speeches. The legislation provided
that both captive audience speeches and other employer campaign-
ing within the plant were to be offset by permitting a limited num-
ber of non-employee union organizers to campaign in designated
non-working areas during non-working time.219 Consequently, the
213 See note 199 supra & accompanying text.
214The union's right of reply was triggered whenever the employer stated the
company's views on union representation on company time or property as part of a
"systematic employer anti-union campaign," regardless of whether the audience was
one employee or a group. If the statement did not constitute a captive audience
speech, the union would have an opportunity to discuss the issues with employees
in nonworking areas during nonworking hours. 1978 SENATE REPoRT, supra note
207, at 25. See also 124 CONG. REc. S7530 (daily ed. May 16, 1978) (remarks of
Sen. Williams).
215 1978 SmATE REPORT, supra note 207, at 23-25.
216 See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
217 See note 208 supra.
218 See text accompanying notes 183-87 supra.
219 Only two organizers were to be allowed in each nonworking area, and four
in the parking lots. Byrd substitute, supra note 212, at § 4.
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Byrd substitute adopted the worst possible reform of the free speech
and equal access area. Under the formulation proposed in the
Byrd substitute, unions would be unable effectively to counter em-
ployer campaign advantages, despite legislative action allowing a
significant intrusion into employer property rights. In addition,
the content of campaign speech would be deregulated, even though
union access would be inadequate to foster thorough and informa-
tive debate on election issues.
In summary, although the Senate Bill went too far, the Byrd
substitute did not go far enough in attempting to assure equal access
in NLRB representation elections. Moreover, neither bill ad-
dressed the home visit issue, a critical element in any comprehensive
reform. Nevertheless, the general approach taken by these bills-
increased union access and limited de-regulation of election speech
-is a meritorious one that may lead to the adoption of a unified
approach to labor law reform in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Labor representation elections are the linchpin of American
industrial democracy. Although there is a general consensus that
both parties in these elections, as in conventional political elections,
are entitled to an opportunity to present their argument to the
electorate before the vote, defining the exact parameters of this
opportunity has proven problematic.
This Comment has examined the existing legal standards
governing free speech and equal access in representation elections,
and has concluded that fundamental change is necessary. To further
this end, various possibilities for reform have been analyzed and a
unified approach for legislative action has been suggested.
As evidenced by the resistance to labor reform proposals in
the Ninety-fifth Congress, however, reform will not come easily.
The permissible content of election speech and the appropriate
circumstances for election campaigning are controversial issues be-
cause of the high stakes involved. Indeed, the speech and access
restrictions placed on unions and employers in the conduct of
representation elections will help determine the outcome of specific
labor elections and the relative strength of unions and management
in the total national economy.
Despite the controversial nature of the issues involved, the
need for meeting this legislative challenge is clear. Congress should
continue to debate these issues until both the House and the Senate
enact an improved and unified approach to free speech and equal
access in labor representation elections.
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